Can we count on Pakistan?

14 Dec 2008, 0220 hrs IST, Indrani Bagchi, TNN
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Farhana Ali is a former counterterrorism expert, first with the CIA and then with the defence think-tank, Rand Corporation. At a panel discussion
post-26/11 she said, “A few days after the attacks, I received an email from a source in Pakistan who meets with...the leader of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD). He wrote, ‘According to two senior sources within jihadi outfits and as many in the intelligence agencies, the recent terror attacks in different parts of Mumbai...were masterminded by Pakistani intelligence agency ISI... The Lashkar leaders are not accepting the responsibility at official level but they are taking pride in claiming it among their trusted people.’... I think it is very clear that if you look at LeT’s strategy, it is to weaken India and to help establish the caliphate which is part of their ideological programme...My sources say at least 23 (attackers were involved).”

Ali’s remarks may show, more than anything else, the new face of jihad with Pakistan its epicentre and India in its crosshairs.

The Mumbai attacks have many lessons for the world, particularly Indian policy makers. It is clear that global jihad’s goals are now enmeshed in the India-Pakistan dynamic. It is equally obvious that multiple weapons, including coercive diplomacy, are needed to wage this war on terror. We also need a reality check on where India fits into the global jihad matrix, given the sophisticated planning and execution of the Mumbai attacks.

In the days following the attacks, a traumatized India lashed out at everything it could. Predictably, the terrorist threat became an extension of Indo-Pak relations, with all the attendant nuances of war and a hostile nuclear-armed neighbour.

But despite the cumulative anger, war is not really regarded as an option at this point. And yet India needs to do something. So does Pakistan and the wider world.

What should Pakistan do?
That’s the easy part. Take action against ALL terrorist groups on its soil, not just the Jamaat-ud-Dawa. Reform and purge the ISI of Taliban and al- Qaida-friendly elements. Most important, rewire its strategic thinking in relation to India and Afghanistan. At a more fundamental level, Pakistan has to be taught to stop using terrorism as a foreign policy tool. For that to happen, there has to be a way for its newly elected civilian government to retain control of foreign policy, rather than being forced to farm it out to the army-ISI combine.

Under international pressure and driven by fears of Indian military action, Pakistan’s civilian government ignored a sullen military-intelligence establishment and took the first steps against the JuD, which had morphed from LeT into an al-Qaida clone using its charitable activities as a front. Pakistan created its own nemesis by allowing the outfit to assume the avatar of a socio-political organization. But there appears to be no realization of this in much of Pakistan, considering the first protests on Friday against the JuD ban resounded with pro-Lashkar chants.

The question for India is: Can President Zardari’s fragile civilian government deliver? Security analyst Ayesha Siddiqa, author of Military Inc, says that while the government wants to root out militancy, it’s not yet clear how much support there is for this enterprise in the military. “The political government is serious. The political government knows that it will get no space to operate if the radical right is in partnership with the military. So it wants to crack down,” she is quoted to say. There is institutional support for these groups within the army. Though American pressure is forcing it to withdraw its most overt support, but for how long?

What are India's options?
The choices are fairly limited. Short of exercising the military option, there’s little it can do to impose its will on Pakistan on its own.

India can freeze bilateral trade and diplomatic and people-to-people contact, such as travel and cricket tournaments. But all of this will affect the very constituency in Pakistan that India wants to engage. Besides, a belligerent and muscular Indian response will weaken the civilian government’s tenuous hold on Pakistan and create space for the military to take centrestage. That cannot be good for India in the long term. Yet, if it does nothing, it runs the risk of being seen as a weak state, not just domestically but internationally. India’s real problem with the Pakistani state is the lack of a well-defined source of power. The civilian government, the army-ISI complex, the jihadis — all appear to be participants in the Pakistani power structure.

Fortunately, what India needs to do most at this juncture is to strengthen internal security rather than hoping Pakistan can be forced to change its ways. Even after terrorist groups are banned and driven underground (like the United Jihad Council, which has wiped out all traces of its existence after the crackdown), the terrorist threat from Pakistan will remain for the foreseeable future. India’s best hope would be to create the kind of dynamic defences that can address a constant and unrelenting threat. This is where the international community can do a great deal.

What can the world do?
There is general consensus that the Mumbai carnage could spawn copycat attacks by al-Qaida affiliates in other parts of the world, and that terrorism from Pakistan needs to be addressed urgently and comprehensively. Accordingly, the international community needs to use Pakistan’s precarious financial position to force its establishment to take the necessary steps. The US needs to use its considerable military clout to weed out Talibanism and Taliban-ites within the Pakistani army. Pakistan should be pushed to reorient its strategic thinking. Military and other aid should be conditional. Pakistan will act only if pushed to the precipice. The world must make it clear that this is the precipice.