ANALYSIS: Talking to the Taliban —Najmuddin A Shaikh ( Ex-Foreign Secy. of Pakistan )

While the induction of the Taliban into the power structure in Afghanistan may be acceptable as part of the American exit strategy, a similar compromise in Pakistan would be entirely unacceptable

In Pakistan, we are so taken with the domestic political turbulence that little or no attention is being paid by our media and particularly by our analysts to developments in Afghanistan, and even more importantly to the hints that have started appearing in the American media about the direction the Obama administration’s review of its Afghan policy is likely to take.

First things first, we have had in Afghanistan a mini-crisis about the date for the presidential elections. According to the constitution, elections should have been held at least thirty days before the expiry of the term of the president. The election commission however decided that given weather conditions and the difficulties associated with voter registration, the election could be held at the earliest in August. This announcement was immediately endorsed by the US and the UN.

The constitution has however been interpreted as holding that the president’s term cannot be extended even if elections have not been held. It apparently makes no provision for who would take over in the interim. In a belated move, Hamid Karzai issued a decree calling upon the election commission to hold the election before the expiry of his term.

This caused an explosion of protests by Karzai’s opponents and statements by the Americans that the date should remain as decided by the election Commission. Karzai has backtracked and accepted that the election commission’s decision should stand, but is now looking for a means to continue in office until the elections. Whether he succeeds in doing so may depend on the Afghan parliament where Karzai’s supporters appear to be dwindling. How this situation will be resolved remains up in the air.

In the meanwhile, the American and other western media has been full of stories about the cold shoulder that Karzai is getting from the Obama administration, and about the corruption of the Karzai brothers who, from being minor restaurant owners in America, have now become millionaire businessmen in Afghanistan. There is particular concern being expressed about Wali Karzai, who maintains a grip on Kandahar’s political life and uses it to promote his interests in the drug trade.

Alongside this indictment of the Karzai family have been stories of maladministration and poor governance to which is attributed the growth in the Taliban insurgency. Are the Americans preparing to dump Karzai in favour of some other more effective leader? They don’t seem to have much of a choice. No Pashtun figure of any consequence and popularity appears to be available.

On the other side, Obama, after a period of reflection, has yielded to the pleas of his commanders in Afghanistan and sanctioned an immediate 17,000-strong troop augmentation in Afghanistan. He has, however, postponed a decision on the remaining 13,000 demanded by commanders until the review of Afghan policy — in consultation with Pakistan, Afghanistan and other countries — is complete.

Surprising for some has been the decision to invite the Iranians to participate in this review. Secretary Clinton has explained that Iran had cooperated with the US when it first moved against the Taliban in Afghanistan and suggested that this continued to be a common interest. It would seem, however, that this is part of the Obama plan to reach out to those who are prepared to “unclench” their fist and to find a way of assuring Iran that Obama is not looking for regime change, but instead trying to find common ground even while opposing Iran’s nuclear programme.

While apparently far fetched, it may also be an effort to persuade Iran to permit the use of its ports for the transportation of American supplies to Afghanistan. This need has become urgent because of instability in Pakistan and the Kyrgyz demand, presumably under Russian pressure, for the US to vacate Manas Airbase. The Russians have permitted shipments across their territory and have indicated that under the right circumstances, they would permit further supplies. But the US would be loath to make this their primary supply route since they could then be required to pay the heavy price of recognising Russia’s right to have its sphere of influence in Central Asia and to be the only route to Europe for Central Asian fossil fuel.

The Obama administration has been consulting extensively with its European allies on the Afghan situation. More such consultations will be held before the review of Afghan policy is completed, but already it is evident that Obama’s popularity in Europe notwithstanding, the Europeans are not going to offer additional troops for Afghanistan nor is there likely to be any change in the position of countries like Canada and Netherlands, who have indicated dates on which their contingents will be withdrawn from Afghanistan.

All the US can hope for is a greater European effort to support the economic and institutional development effort in Afghanistan. So far, however, the Europeans have been found wanting on this front as well.

In the popular perception, even though the Afghan war has been ongoing for seven years, it will henceforth be Obama’s war because he had maintained throughout the campaign that this was the war America had to fight and win, in contrast to Bush’s war of choice in Iraq. Obama cannot therefore afford to withdraw from Afghanistan but he can revise the aims and objectives he sets for declaring victory. Hence the statement by Defence Secretary Robert Gates that all the US should aim for is a situation where Afghanistan cannot be used as a haven for terrorists wanting to attack the US and its allies. Subsequently, it was only logical for Obama to talk, albeit cautiously, about the possibility of negotiating with the Taliban.

However, most American analysts suggest that there is good reason to believe that the haven for terrorists has already shifted from Afghanistan to Pakistan, and that even if the Taliban were to be sharing power in Afghanistan, they would have no ambitions extending beyond Afghanistan. They would therefore not pose the sort of danger to America that they did while playing host to Al Qaeda.

No one is prepared to take an equally benign view of Pakistan. Juxtaposed with the onset of the current political crisis and following closely on the “deal” in Swat has been the statement by the American charge d’affaires in Afghanistan that Pakistan is more dangerous than Afghanistan. (This view has frequently appeared in the American media but coming form an American diplomat in Afghanistan, it has added significance.). More recently, there have been reports suggesting that American intelligence agencies now believe that the Lashkar-e Tayba rather than Al Qaeda may be the organisation that launches the next terrorist attack on the West.

Let us also be clear that while the induction of the Taliban into the power structure in Afghanistan may be acceptable as part of the American exit strategy, a similar compromise in Pakistan would be entirely unacceptable. The simple reason for this is that here, the Taliban or their local cohorts are seen as sanctuary providers for Al Qaeda and as having many in the mélange of extremist groups operating in Pakistan that have strong links in the Pakistani diaspora in the US and Europe.

Today in Washington, the political crisis in Afghanistan, while real and worrisome, is small potatoes compared to the concern about Pakistan and what the current crisis will mean for the tribal areas, where the army has achieved some success, and for Swat, where the pact with Sufi Mohammad is being watched warily.

The writer is a former foreign secretary