Afghanistan under Taliban

By Manju Gupta

Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, Antonio Giustozzi, Foundation Books, Pp 259, Rs 595.00

This book, written by a historian after years of research on Afghanistan beginning in 2003, is not an addition to the vast literature available on counter-insurgency but combines an analysis of the development of insurgency by focusing on the root causes of the weaknesses of the Afghan state. The author says that announcements of an impending victory over the Taliban were being made ad nauseam since the Allied invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, particularly following the presidential elections of 2004, which were declared as the “moral and psychological defeat of the Taliban” and that “the Taliban are no longer able to fight large battles”. However, in reality, insurgency had started developing strong roots inside Afghanistan in 2003 and its spread throughout the southern half of the country took place step by step for over four years.

Though the insurgent activities began in 2002 following the American attack on Taliban, violent incidents occurred in the mountainous border areas of eastern and south-eastern Afghanistan with a “rather mysterious attack on Bagrami district (Kabul) in August.” Initially these incidents were attributed to remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda which had been unable to flee to Pakistan and were seen as mainly fighting for survival. But a spate of terrorist attacks in Kabul and increase in guerrilla attacks during the late summer highlighted that something new had started. Better organised efforts to ignite a large-scale insurgency seemed to have begun in September 2002 with planting of mines on the roads and rocket or mortar attacks on US bases.

Despite difficulties in operating during the winter in mountainous areas, the insurgency gathered sufficient momentum to keep up its pace while expanding its operations. In 2003, the main achievement of the Taliban was the elimination of government influence in the countryside of Kabul and eastern Pakistan. In 2004, they established strongholds in Uruzgan and Kandhahar province. Gradually they eliminated government presence from southern Ghazni. In 2006, their activities spread to the largely Pashtun area with increase in attacks. How and why did this expansion occur?

The author proceeds to provide answers for the resurgence of the Taliban. Chapter one describes the ‘ideology’ of the Taliban and the role of the external sponsors, identifying the intrinsic weaknesses of the Afghan state and its internal fissures which have contributed to breeding of the rebellion. The author says that to fight a war, the leadership of an insurgency movement has first to secure renewable sources of recruits, a problem which has been difficult to tackle for many rebel groups. Chapter two looks at the issue in detail, distinguishing between the original nucleus that decided to start a new war which became something bigger. This chapter also deals with the sources of funding which have kept the neo-Taliban going after 2001. However, even a well-organised insurgency might not go far unless it conceives a strategy pitting its strengths against the enemy’s weaknesses. Chapter four analyses the strategy of the Taliban in its different aspects—military, psychological and political. Chapter five looks at the military technology of the insurgents and their fighting skills. Finally, since no analyis of the insurgency can be complete without discussing the counter-insurgency efforts, Chapter six examines the different military actors in the counter-insurgency as well as the strategies and tactics adopted. It also looks at the strategic development by the Afghan Government and by international actors to seize political ground from the insurgency and to contain it.

The main argument of this book is that despite the role of foreign sponsors, the insurgency could not have succeeded in becoming more than a minor irritant if it had not been able to exploit the intrinsic weaknesses of the Afghan state, both as it was originally conceived and as it was ‘rebuilt’ from 2001. Giustozzi concludes that apart from a ‘bad’ government, postponement and delay of reforms are in nobody’s interest except in the insurgents’ and of western politicians who are more concerned with their electoral prospects than with the future of Afghanistan.

This is quite an informative analysis of the painful situation in Afghanistan.